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Abstract. Group signatures allow group members to sign an arbitrary number of messages
on behalf of the group without revealing their identity. Under certain circumstances the group
manager holding a tracing key can reveal the identity of the signer from the signature. Practical
group signature schemes should support membership revocation where the revoked member loses
the capability to sign a message on behalf of the group without inuencing the other non-revoked
members. A model known as verier-local revocation supports membership revocation. In this
model the trusted revocation authority sends revocation messages to the veriers and there is
no need for the trusted revocation authority to contact non-revoked members to update their
secret keys. Previous constructions of verier-local revocation group signature schemes either
have a security proof in the random oracle model or are non-identity based. A security proof in
the random oracle model is only a heuristic proof and non-identity-based group signature suer
from standard Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) problems, i.e. the group public key is not derived
from the group identity and therefore has to be certied.
In this work we construct the rst verier-local revocation group signature scheme which is
identity-based and which has a security proof in the standard model. In particular, we give a
formal security model for the proposed scheme and prove that the scheme has the property of
seless-anonymity under the decision Linear (DLIN) assumption and it is fully-traceable under
the Computation Die-Hellman (CDH) assumption. The proposed scheme is based on prime
order bilinear groups.
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1 Introduction
In public key cryptography, the authenticity of cryptographic keys is important. The party
who encrypts the data (in case of a public key encryption), or a party who veries a signature
(in case of a digital signature), needs to be assured that the public key belongs to the right
user who is also in possession of the corresponding private key. In a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI), the Certicate Authority (CA) generates a digital certicate, which contains a digital
signature, to assure that the public key belongs to the right user. Whenever a user wants
to use a public key, the user has to obtain the digital certicate and verify the signature. In
practice PKI technology suers from many drawbacks such as certicate verication, revoca-
tion, distribution, storage, etc [18]. On the other hand, in the Identity-Based Cryptography,
introduced by Shamir [22], the public key is derived from the identity of the user (e.g.name,
email address, IP address), thus there is no need for a use of digital certicates to certify the
public key.
The aim of this paper is to construct an identity-based group signature scheme which
supports member revocations and which has a security proof in the standard model. Group
signatures, introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [14], allow a group member to sign a message
on behalf of the group such that other group members cannot reveal the identity of the
signer, but in certain circumstances the group manager has the power to reveal the identity
of the signer from the signature. The verier of the group signature uses the public key of
the group to verify that the signature is generated by a group member. Non-identity based
group signatures suer from the aforementioned PKI problems, while by using an identity-
based group signature one avoids the need to use digital certicates. In addition to removing
the need for digital certicates, supporting membership revocation is important as well. In
particular, there are situations when a group member may leave the group voluntarily or a
group member might get compromised. Previous group signatures in the literature, which
support membership revocation, have either a security proof in the random oracle model or
are non-identity based. It is well known that the random oracle model is a heuristic security
model. Canetti et. al. [13] shows that there are signature schemes which are secure in the
random oracle model but which are insecure for any implementation of the random oracle.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper we propose a group signature scheme, named as verier-local revocation identity-
based group signature (VLR-IBGS), which simultaneously satises the following desirable
properties:
1. VLR-IBGS supports membership revocation such that a group member losses his signing
capabilities after the revocation. In general, revocation may happen when a group member
leaves the group voluntarily, when the member secret key is compromised, or when the
member is misbehaving by giving his secret key to unauthorized users.
2. VLR-IBGS has a security proof in the standard model. In particular, we show that the
scheme has the property of seless-anonymity under the Decisional Linear (DLIN) assump-
tion and is fully-traceable under the Computational Die-Hellman (CDH) assumption.
Seless-anonymity ensures that the digital signature does not reveal the identity of the
signer while the owner of a secret key can detect whether the signature was created by
her secret key and full-traceability allows the group manager to recover the identity of the
signer whenever a dispute arises.
3. VLR-IBGS is identity-based where the group public key is derived from the group identity
and does not have to be certied.
We believe that the design of a group signature scheme which satisfy the above properties, is
interesting for two reasons. The rst reason is that VLR-IBGS lls the gap with existing group
signature by providing a more comprehensive scheme with more interesting properties and the
other reason is that VLR-IBGS makes group signatures even more useful for constructing other
primitives, specically for constructing sanitizable signatures. Sanitizable signatures allow a
semi-trusted party, called the sanitizer, to modify parts of the signed data without interacting
with the original signer. Berzuska et. al. [9], give the rst sanitizable signature which uses
group signature as a building block. However, when non-identity based group signatures are
used to construct sanitazable signatures, including the scheme in [9], the public key of the
original signer and the sanitizer needs to be registered (i.e. certied). In this context, a group
signature with the above properties removes the need to certify the public key and also allows
the original signer to revoke the sanitizer, if required.
Our contribution can be viewed as complementing the work of Smart and Warinschi [23]
and Libert and Vergnaud [20]. Smart and Warinschi [23] provide a model for an identity-based
group signature scheme and give a generic construction based on the hierarchical identity-
based encryption (HIBE) [15] scheme and the Boyen and Waters [7,8] signature schemes.
The main dierence between our work and the work of [23] is that the latter focuses merely
on constructing an identity-based group signature scheme, whereas our work focuses on con-
structing an identity-based group signature scheme which supports membership revocation.
Libert and Vergnaud [20] give an non-identity based group signature which supports mem-
bership revocation and which is secure in the standard model. Computationally our scheme is
more ecient than Libert and Vergnaud scheme, since the latter uses pairing operations when
the signature is created, however our scheme uses pairing operations only in the verication
phase. It is also important to mention that the security proof of the Libert and Vergnaud
scheme is based on slightly stronger assumptions than the security proof of our scheme. On
the other hand the Libert-Vergnaud scheme support backward unlinkability which is used to
protect anonymity of signatures of revoked members; whereas our scheme does not support
this property.
1.2 More Related Work
Group Signatures. Since Chaum and Van Heyst [14] introduced the concept, a number of group
signatures schemes have been proposed [1,2,3,4,10,11,12,19,24]. Many ecient group signature
scheme have been proposed in the random oracle model, however the random oracle model is
a heuristic security model. Bellare et. al. [3] proposed security denitions for group signature
schemes and gave the rst construction provable secure in the standard model. Boyen and
Waters [7,8] suggested an ecient group signature with security proofs in the standard model.
The Boyen and Waters construction is a two-level signature scheme in which the rst level
of the signature is the signers identity and the second level is the message to be signed. In
a later scheme of Boyen and Waters [8], to hide the identity of the signer, the scheme uses
bilinear groups of composite order and uses non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs.
The assumptions under which the scheme is proven secure imply that it is dicult to factor
the composite order of the bilinear group. The scheme is inecient compared to schemes which
use prime order groups since it uses larger group elements with more expensive operations.
Groth [17] gives a practical group signature scheme based on prime order bilinear groups and
a security proof under standard assumptions: the strong Die-Hellman assumption (q-SDH),
the decision Linear (DLIN) assumption and the unfakeability assumption (q-U). The size of
the q-SDH and q-U assumptions depends on the number of queries asked by the adversary.
Therefore, the security proof under these assumptions requires larger security parameters
compared to other security proof which use constant size assumptions where the size of the
assumption does not depend on the number of queries asked by the adversary.
Verier-Local Revocation Group Signatures. The simplest revocation method is due to Ate-
niese et. al. [2] where the group manager changes the group public key and the secret keys
of non-revoked members. However the scheme is not ecient since the key update can be
a bottleneck for both the group manager and non-revoked members. Another method [4,12]
is to broadcast a small message to all signers and veriers. Only non-revoked members can
use the broadcast message to update their secret keys and generate a valid signature. For the
revoked members the broadcast message is a redundant value and cannot help them to update
their secret keys. The drawback of this approach is that the signer has to perform computa-
tions depending on the number of revoked members. The high number of signer computations
makes this model unsuitable for low-cost devices.
A more ecient solution known as verier-local revocation (VLR) [24,6,21] is to send revo-
cation tokens to veriers. In this model there is no need for the trusted revocation authority
Reference Membership Revo-
cation
Identity-Based Security Proof
Boyen-Waters [7,8] No Yes Standard Model
Groth [17] No No Standard Model
Boneh-Shacham [6] Yes No Random Oracle Model
Smart-Warinschi [23] No Yes Standard Model
Libert-Vergnaud [20] Yes No Standard Model
This paper Yes Yes Standard Model
Table 1. Comparison of our scheme with the most ecient related work
to contact non-revoked members to update their secret keys while the verier performs com-
putations depending on the number of revoked members. The Song [24] scheme is based on
the strong RSA assumption and it is inecient due to the use of inecient zero-knowledge
proofs. The Boneh and Shacham [6] scheme is based on bilinear maps and has short signatures.
Nakanishi and Funabiki [21] have proposed a VLR group signature scheme with the property
of backward unlinkability. This property means that all signatures produced by the member
before the revocation remain anonymous. The security proofs of the Boneh and Shacham [6]
and Nakanishi and Funabiki [21] scheme is in the random oracle model.
In table 1 we compare our scheme with the most ecient previous work. The comparison is
based on following properties: a) functionality of the scheme - whether the scheme supports
membership revocation, b) the way of generating the group public key - whether the scheme is
identity-based, and c) security proof - whether the scheme has a security proof in the standard
model or a random oracle model.
Organization of the paper. In section 2 we dene the syntax of VLR-IBGS scheme and the
required security properties. In this section we also briey review the basics of bilinear pairing
and complexity assumptions under which the security of the proposed scheme is based. In
section 3 we present the construction of the scheme, its correctness proof along with the
formal security proof. The last section concludes the paper.
Notation. If S is a set then s 2R S denotes that s is selected uniformly at random from S.
If  2 N, then 1 denotes the string consisting of  ones. A stands for the adversary which
is a polynomial-time algorithm. We write A(x; y; :::; ) to indicate that the algorithm A has
inputs x; y; :::;, and we write z  A(x; y; :::; ) to indicate the operation of running A with
inputs x; y; ::: and getting z as output. We write fSigni=1 to denote fS1; S2; :::; Sng. A function
P (k) : Z! R is negligible if, for every polynomial f(k), there exists an integer Nf such that
P (k)  1f(k) for all k  Nf . Unless noted otherwise, all algorithms are randomized and run
in polynomial time.
2 Model and Security Denitions
Denition 1. The verier-local revocation identity-based group signature scheme VLR-IBGS
consists of ve algorithms:
{ Setup(1) : run by the TA, the algorithm produces the master public key mpk and the
master secret key msk for the security parameter  2 N. The master public key mpk is
stored in a publicly accessible database.
{ Group Setup(msk;mpk;G) : run by the TA, the algorithm produces a group secret key
skG, which is given to a group manager.
{ Enroll(skG;mpk; U) : run by a group manager, the algorithm produces a member secret
key skG;U which is given to a group member.
{ Sign(M;mpk; skG;U ) : run by a group member, the algorithm produces a signature  on
the message M .
{ Verify(M;;<;mpk;G) : run by a verier, the algorithm returns true if  is a valid
signature i.e. the signature is issued by a signer who is in the group G and does not have a
revocation token in the list of revoked members <. Otherwise, the algorithm returns false.
For correctness is required for all skG  Group Setup(msk;mpk;G), all skG;U  Enroll
(skG;mpk; U), any message M 2 f0; 1g, if the signer U does not have a revocation token in
the list of revoked members <, then:
Pr [Verify (M; Sign(M;mpk;Enroll(skG;mpk; U));<;mpk;G) = true] = 1
The VLR-IBGS has to fulll two main security requirements: seless-anonymity and full-
traceability.
The property of seless-anonymity requires from a group signature scheme to provide
anonymity for the signer. In particular, the signature should not reveal the identity of the
signer and an adversary should not be able to distinguish a signature generated by member
U0 from a signature generated by member U1 . The notion of selessness [6] implies that the
group member can detect whether her secret key generated the signature.
Denition 2. (Seless-Anonymity). The VLR-IBGS scheme is said to fulll the requirement
of seless-anonymity if any A has only a negligible advantage in the seless-anonymity game
which is dened as follows:
{ Setup: The challenger runs (mpk;msk) Setup(1) and gives mpk to A.
{ Query Phase 1: A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries:
 Group Setup Query. A requests a group secret key skG for a group G. The challenger
runs skG  Group Setup(msk;mpk;G) and gives skG to A .
 Enroll Query. A requests a secret key for the member U who belongs to the group G.
The challenger runs skG;U  Enroll(skG;mpk; U) and gives skG;U to A.
 Sign Query. A requests a signature on a message M generated by the group G and
member identity U . The challenger runs   Sign(M; mpk; skG;U ) and returns  to
A.
 Revocation Query. A asks for a revocation token for a member U belonging to a group
G. The challenger returns a token T to A.
{ Challenge: A sends to the challenger a message M, a group identity G, and two member
identities U0 and U1. A is restricted in his queries such that A should not have asked for: a)
a group secret key for G during Group Setup Queries, b) a member secret key for (U0,U1)
in the Enroll Query, and c) a revocation token for (U0,U1) in the Revocation Query. The
challenger picks a random bit b 2 f0; 1g, runs   Sign(M;mpk; skG;Ub), and returns
 to A.
{ Query Phase 2: A is allowed to ask additional queries as follows:
 Group Setup Query. A requests a group secret key skG for a group G with the restriction
that G 6= G.
 Enroll Query. A requests a secret key for the member U who belongs to group G with
the restriction that G 6= G ^ U =2 fU0; U1g.
 Sign Query. Same as in Query Phase 1.
 Revocation Query. Same as in Query Phase 1 but A cannot ask for a revocation token
for members U0 and U1 belonging to the group G
.
{ Guess: A outputs a bit b0 2 f0; 1g and wins if b0 = b.
The advantage of A in breaking the seless-anonymity property is:
ADVselfless anonyA;V LR IBGS () =
Pr[A wins]  12

where the probability is taken over the random values chosen by A and the challenger.
The requirement of full-traceability captures the notion of unforgeability: the adversary
cannot create a valid signature if the group manager cannot trace it to one of the group
members. As mentioned by Boneh and Shacham [6], any VLR group signature scheme has an
implicit tracing algorithm. The implicit tracing algorithm of our scheme uses the token T to
determine whether a revoked member produced the signature. To determine the identity of
the signer producing the signature  for the message M , the algorithm operates as follows:
{ For each member U enrolled in G run: Verify(M;;<;mpk; G).
{ Output U of the rst member for which false Verify(M;;<; mpk;G).
Denition 3. The VLR-IBGS scheme is fully-traceable if any A has only a negligible advan-
tage in the full-traceability game which is dened as follows:
{ Setup: The challenger runs (mpk;msk) Setup(1) and gives mpk to A.
{ Query Phase: A performs a polynomially bounded number of Group Setup Query, Enroll Query
and Sign Query queries same as in the seless-anonymity game.
{ Forgery Phase: A outputs a forgery (M; ;<;mpk;G).
A wins the fully-traceability game if: a) Verify(M; ;<;mpk;G) = true, b) A did not
make a Sign Query for (M; G), c) A did not make a Group Setup Query for G, and d) 
traces to a member outside [U ] n <.
The advantage of A in breaking the fully-traceability property is dened as:
ADVfylly traceA;V LR IBGS() = Pr[A wins]
where the probability is taken over the random values chosen by A and the challenger.
2.1 Complexity Assumptions in Bilinear Groups
Our scheme uses an admissible bilinear map and its security is based on the hardness of the
Computational Die-Hellman (CDH) and Decisional Linear (DLIN) problems. Let G and GT
be two multiplicative groups of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G. A pairing (or
bilinear map) e^ : GG! GT has the following properties [5]:
1. Bilinear: for all u; v 2 G and a; b 2 Zp, we have e^(ua; vb) = e^(u; v)ab.
2. Non-degenerate: e^(g; g) 6= 1.
G is said to be a bilinear group if the group operation inG and the bilinear map e^ : GG! GT
can be computed eciently.
Denition 4. The Computational Die-Hellman Problem (CDH) in G is, given ele-
ments (g; ga; gb) 2 G with a; b 2 Zp, to compute gab.
Denition 5. The Decisional Linear Problem (DLIN) in G is, given a tuple (g; g1; g2;
ga1 ; g
b
2; g
c) 2 G with a; b 2 Zp, decide whether c = a+ b or c 2R G.
3 Description of the Scheme
In this section we present the VLR-IBGR scheme that enjoys the security proof in the standard
model under the CDH and DLIN assumptions. In a high level, the scheme relies on the presence
of a trusted authority (TA) who is in possession of a master key. The TA is responsible for
generating system parameters and for creating new groups. A group is managed by a group
manager whose responsibility is to enroll new members to the group. The groups are dynamic
- new members can join the group after the system parameters are generated. The scheme
also allows users to be enrolled in more than one group.
The scheme adapts techniques from Boyen and Waters [7] two-level hierarchical signature
scheme to sign and verify messages. Our contribution lies in creating a new mechanism for
revoking members which is quite dierent comparing to other group signature schemes which
support revocation. More specically, in the enrollment phase, a group manager generates
a user specic tag T which is used to construct the member secret key. The tag T is a
secret value known only to the group manager and to the group member. If the value of the
tag T is revealed, the signer (group member) who holds the tag T cannot sign anonymous
messages on behalf of the group anymore, and thus implicitly the member is revoked. The
group manager simply revokes a member by adding the tag T to the publicly accessible list of
revoked members <. The verier accepts the group signature if the signer belongs to a group
and if the signer does not have an entry in <.
The scheme is based on prime-order bilinear groups. It is important to mention that cryp-
tographic schemes which are based on prime-order bilinear groups are more ecient than
schemes based on composite-order bilinear groups since the size of the prime-order group is
smaller than the size of the composite-order group. Due to this fact, group operations on
prime-order groups are faster than group operations on composite-order groups.
We build a VLR-IBGS scheme VLR-IBGS=(Setup, Group Setup, Enroll, Sign, Verify) as
follows:
{ Setup(1): The TA selects a bilinear group G of prime order p and elements g; g1; g2 2R
G. It also chooses bilinear map e^ : G  G ! GT . Next to that, the algorithm picks
; ; y; z; f; t 2R Zp, y1; :::; yk 2R Zp and z1; :::; zm 2R Zp.
The master public key mpk and the master secret key msk are constructed as follows:
mpk = ( g; g1; g2; 1 = g
t
1; 2 = g
f
2 ; g
t; gf ; e^(g; g); g ; u = gy; fui = gyigki=1;
v = gz; fvj = gzjgmj=1 )
msk = ( g; ; f; t )
The TA stores the master public key mpk in a publicly accessible database and keeps
secret the master secret key msk.
{ Group Setup(msk;mpk;G): To create a secret key for a group represented as a bit string
G = (1; :::; k) 2 f0; 1gk, the TA picks a random value w 2R Zp and outputs a group
secret key skG = (skG(1) ; skG(2) ; skG(3) ; skG(4) ; skG(5)) where:
skG(1) = g
 

u
Qk
i=1 u
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w
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w
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w
1 skG(5) = g
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The TA sends the group secret key skG to the group manager through a secure channel.
{ Enroll(skG;mpk; U): To create a secret key for a member with an identity U who is a
member of a group G, the algorithm picks a tag T 2R Zp, an element x0 2R Zp and outputs
a member secret key skG;U = (skG;U(1) ; skG;U(2) ; skG;U(3) ; skG;U(4) ; skG;Uid(5)) where:
skG;U(1) = skG(1) 
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skG;U(5) = T
and x = w + x0. The group manager sends through a secure channel the member secret
key skG;U to the group member. The group manager keeps a membership table which
contains the identities and tags (U; T ) of registered members. If a group member U is
revoked, the group manager publishes the entry of the revoked member. As mentioned
above, the entry of the revoked member is stored in the list of revoked members < which
in turn is stored in a publicly accessible database.
The group manager can avoid having to keep a membership table by not picking the tag
as T 2R Zp, but by using a pseudorandom function (PRF) (see [16]) for properties of
pseudorandom functions) which would take as input the identity of the member U and
output the tag T .
{ Sign(M;mpk; skG;U ): To sign a message represented as a binary stringM = (1; :::; m) 2
f0; 1gm, the signer picks s; ';  2R Zp and outputs the signature  = ((1); (2); (3); (4); (5);
(6); (7); (8)) where:
(1) = skG;U(1) 
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{ Verify(M;;<;mpk;G): The verier performs the following steps (in order) to check the
validity of the signature:
1. Signature Check. The verier checks whether the signer who belongs to a group
represented as a bit string G = (1; :::; k) 2 f0; 1gk has signed the message M =
(1; :::; m) 2 f0; 1gm. Therefore the verier checks whether the following equation
holds:
e^
 
(1); g

e^

u
Qk
i=1 u
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i ; (2)

 e^

v
Qm
j=1 v
j
j ; (3)
 = e^(g; g)
If this holds, the verier proceeds to the revocation check, otherwise the verier outputs
false.
2. Revocation Check. The verier checks whether the identity of the signer is in the
list of revoked members < = f(Ui; Ti) ; :::; (Ur; Tr)g. The verier performs the following
computations:
 Firstly, the verier checks whether the signature  is "well formed" 4:
e^
 
(8); (2)
  e^  (5); gt  e^(6); gf = e^  (4); g
If this holds, the verier proceeds to the next step of the revocation check, otherwise
the verier outputs false.
 Secondly, the verier checks whether the signer has a revocation token in < = f(Ui; Ti)
; :::; (Ur; Tr)g. The verier for each Uh 2 < checks whether the following equation holds:
e^
 
(4); g
 6= e^(7); gTh  e^  (5); gt  e^(6); gf
If this holds, the verier outputs true (the signature is accepted), otherwise the verier
outputs false (the signature is not accepted).
4 The signer has to compute (4) using skG;U(3) . However, the signer can compute (4) using a random value,
say (4) = g
T^ for T^ 2 Zp, and the signature will be accepted since the equation in the second step of the
revocation check will hold for (4) = g
T^ . Therefore, to prevent this attack, in the rst step the verier has to
check whether the signature is well formed. In this way the signer "is forced" to generate (4) using skG;U(3) .
3.1 Correctness of the VLR-IDGS
It is easy to proof that the VLR-IDGS satises the correctness property. For this reason we
have to show that the Verify algorithm indeed returns true when a signature is created by
a group member. If  is a correctly generated signature, then the equation under Signature
Check holds since:
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If  is a "well formed", then the rst equation under Revocation Check holds since:
e^
 
(8); (2)
  e^  (5); gt  e^(6); gf = e^  (4); g =)
e^

gT s; gx+'

 e^  gxs1 ; gt  e^g'2 ; gf = e^g(x+')T  x1s  '2 ; g
If  is a correctly generated signature by a non-revoked member then the second equation
under Revocation Check holds since:
e^((7); g
Th)  e^  (5); gt  e^(6); gf 6= e^  (4); g =)
e^

g(x+')s; gTh

 e^  gxs1 ; gt  e^g'2 ; gf 6= e^g(x+')T  x1s  '2 ; g
In terms of eciency, the size of the signature consists from 8 elements of G and the creation
of a signature requires no pairing operations. An implementation of the scheme using a 256 -
bit group order would produce a signature with size of about 256 byte.
3.2 Seless-Anonymity Security Proof
In this section prove that the VLR-IDGS has the property of seless-anonymity, assuming
that the DLIN problem is hard to be solved.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there is an algorithm (adversary) A that wins the seless-anonymity
game. Then there is an algorithm B that solves decision Linear (DLIN) assumption with prob-
ability ^ = 
2n2
.
Proof. The algorithm B receives the DLIN instance (g; g1; g2; ga1 ; gb2; T ) for g; g1; g2 2R G
and a; b 2R Zp, and either T = ga+b or T is chosen randomly from G. If A is an algorithm
(adversary) that wins the seless-anonymity game, then B can decide which T is given by
running A as a subroutine and in this way solve the DLIN problem.
Therefore, in order for B to solve the DLIN problem, the algorithm B acts as A's challenger
in the seless-anonymity game dened in Denition 2. If T = ga+b then the game being played
is exactly the same as the seless-anonymity game, otherwise, if T is a random element from
G, then the game being played is a dierent game (undened game) denoted as Game. If
the algorithm A wins the game then B outputs the bit b = 1, to indicate that T = ga+b,
otherwise it outputs the bit b = 0, to indicate that T is a random element from G. The game
proceeds as follows:
1. Setup: B picks a fresh uniform ; ; y; z; f; t; y1; :::; yk; z1; :::; zm 2R Zp and gives to A the
master public key:
mpk = ( g; g1; g2; 1 = g
t
1; 2 = g
f
2 ; g
t; gf ; e^(g; g); g ; u = gy; fui = gyigki=1;
v = gz; fvj = gzjgmj=1 )
The distribution of the mpk in seless-anonymity game is identical to the mpk of the Setup
of the scheme since by the DLIN assumption g; g1; g2 are random generators of the group G.
Further, ; ; y; z; f; t; y1; :::; yk; z1; :::; zm are chosen at random from Zp same as in the actual
scheme. Thus mpk as generated by B has an identical distribution to the output of Setup.
2. Query Phase 1. A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries:
{ Group Setup Query: A requests a group secret key skG for a group G. B runs skG  
Group Setup(msk;mpk;G) same as in the scheme and return skG to A.
{ Enroll Query: A requests a secret key for the member U who belongs to group G. For each
member U =2 fU0; U1g, B runs skG;U  Enroll(skG;mpk; U) in the same way as in the
scheme and returns skG;U to A.
Note that B does not know the secret keys for members U0 and U1 (B needs to know ga
to generate skU0 and skU1). Therefore, if A requests a secret key for the member U0 or
U1, B aborts. However, even if B aborts, we can dene the secret keys for U0 and U1 for
the rest of the simulation. The secret key for members U0 and U1 is dened as:
skG;U0;1(1) = g
 
 
u
kY
i=1
uii
!w

 
u
kY
i=1
uii
!ac
skG;U0;1(2) = g
w  gac
skG;U0;1(3) =

gw  gac
T  w1  ac1
skG;U0;1(4) = g
w
1  gac1
skG;U0;1(5) = T
for randomly chosen T ; w; c 2R Zp. If we set x0 = ac and x = w + x0, where a and c are
chosen uniformly random and independent from Zp (by the DLIN assumption a is chosen
at random from Zp), then the above secret keys and secret keys generated by a group
manager in Enroll of the scheme have the same distribution.
{ Sign Query: A requests a signature on a message M = (1; :::; m) 2 f0; 1gm generated by
U who is a member of the group G = (1; :::; k) 2 f0; 1gk . The algorithm B may operate
in the following two ways:
1. If U =2 fU0; U1g, B runs   Sign(M;mpk; skG;U ) in the same way as in the scheme
and returns  to A.
2. If U 2 fU0; U1g, B picks a fresh uniform c; w; ; s; T 2R Zp, implicitly it sets x = w+ac
and ' = bc, and generates the signature  = ((1); (2); (3); (4); (5); (6); (7); (8))
as follows:
(1) = g
 
 
u
kY
i=1
uii
!w
 T c(y+ki=1iyi) 
0@v mY
j=1
v
j
j
1A+s
(2) = g
w  T c
(3) = g
+s
(4) =

gw  T c
sT  (w1 )s  (ga1)cts  (gb2)cf
(5) = (g
w
1  (ga1)c)s
(6) = (g
b
2)
c
(7) = 
s
2
(8) = g
T s
If T = ga+b, then the signature generated by B in the security game and the signature
generated by the signer in Sign of the scheme have the same distribution since by the
DLIN assumption b is chosen randomly from Zp, so ' is random and independent of all
other values in the view of A. Finally, other values w; ; s; T 2R Zp are chosen in the same
way as in the scheme. Thus, the entire output  is identically distributed to the output
of Sign in the scheme.
{ Revocation Query: A asks for a revocation tag for a member Ui belonging to a group G.
B aborts if A asks for a revocation tag for member U0 or U1. B returns a tag T to A.
3. Challenge: A returns to B two tuples: (M;G; U0) and (M;G; U1 ). If U0 6= U0 and
U1 6= U1, then B aborts. Otherwise, B picks a random bit b 2 f0; 1g and runs   
Sign(M;mpk; skG;Ub ) in the same way as explained under Sign Query. B returns  to A.
4. Query Phase 2: The adversary A issues restricted queries (dened in Denition 2) as in
Query Phase 1.
5. Guess: A outputs a guess b0 2 f0; 1g, and if b0 = b then B outputs 1 and T = ga+b, otherwise
B outputs 0 and T is randomly chosen from G.
When T = ga+b, B gives the perfect simulation of the seless-anonymity game. Therefore
the advantage of A is:
Pr
h
b0 = bjT = ga+b
i
=
1
2
+ 
When T is randomly chosen from G, then the game being played is Game and  is
statistically independent of the challenge identity, therefore the advantage of A is:
Pr

b0 6= bjT 2R G

=
1
2
Assuming that B does not abort in the simulation, the overall advantage to solve DLIN
assumption is 2 . B does not abort if correctly guesses the identities U0 and U1 and none of
the queries in the Query Phase 1 and the choice of the challenge does not cause B to abort.
The probability that queries in the Query Phase 1 and the choice of challenge does not cause
B to abort is at least 1
n2
, where n is the number of members in the scheme. Therefore, we
conclude that B solves DLIN problem with advantage at least 
2n2
. 2
3.3 Full-Traceability Security Proof
In this section we prove the property of traceability assuming that the CDH problem is hard
to be solved. To prove the traceability security proof we closely follow the security analysis
from [7].
Theorem 2. Suppose that there is an algorithm (adversary) A, in an adaptive chosen mes-
sage attack, that after l signature queries in the full-traceability game creates a forgery with a
non-negligible advantage  . Then there is an algorithm B that solves CDH assumption with
probability ^  
2k+2ml
.
Proof. B receives an CDH instance (g; ga; gb) and solves the CDH problem (computes gab)
by running A as a subroutine. The algorithm B acts as As challenger in the full-traceability
game and we show that if A produces a forgery, then B can use that forgery to solve the CDH
problem. The game proceeds as follows:
1. Setup: Let G = f1; :::; kg 2 f0; 1gk be the group for which A wants to create a forgery.
The algorithm B chooses a random number k 2 f0; :::;mg and random numbers x; x1:::; xm
from the interval f0; :::; 2l 1g. Next to that, B chooses y; y1; :::; yk; z; z1; :::; zm; r; t, f; ;W 2R
Zp, it sets y +
Pk
i=1 

i yi  0 (mod p) and g2 = gb, and outputs the master public key:
mpk = (g; g1 = g
r; g2 = g
b; 1 = g
t
1; 2; g
t = gf2 ; g
f ; e^(ga; gb); g
u = gaygW ; fui = gayigki=1)
v = gx 2kl2 g
z; fvj = gxj2 gzjgmj=1)
The mpk generated by B has the same distribution as the mpk generated by Setup of the
scheme. Note that since r and b are chosen at random from Zp (b comes from the CDH
assumption) then g; g1; g2 are random generators of the group G in the view of A. If we set
 = ab, y = ay+W ,yi = ayi; z = b(x 2kl)+ z and zj = bxj + zj then the values ; y; yi; z; zj
have the same distribution as in the scheme since the values a; b; y;W; yi; k; l; z; zj are chosen
uniformly at random. Finally, the values t; f;  are chosen in the same way as in the scheme.
2. Query Phase. A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries:
{ Group Setup Query: A requests a group secret key skG for a group G = f1; :::; kg. Let
T = y +
Pk
i=1 iyi. The challenger B picks z^ 2R Zp and computes g
z^
(gb)
1
T
= gw (thus
z^ = w+ bT ). B returns toA the group secret key skG = (skG(1) ; skG(2) ; skG(3) ; skG(4) ; skG(5)):
skG(1) = g
 Wb
T
 
gW gaT
z^
skG(2) = g
w skG(3) = g
w
skG(4) = g
wtr skG(5) = g
wr
The group secret key skG generated by B in the security game and the skG generated by
Group Setup of scheme have the same distribution since w = z^   bT is a random value
(z^ is chosen at random) in the view of A
{ Enroll Query: A requests a secret key for the group member U who belongs to group G.
B runs skG;U  Enroll(skG;mpk; U) same as in the scheme and returns skG;U to A. The
group secret key skG is computed in the same way as explained under Group Setup Query.
{ Sign Query: A requests a signature on a message M = (1; :::; m) generated by the group
G and member U . B may operate in the following two ways:
I. If G 6= G, B runs   Sign(M;mpk; skG;U ) in the same way as in the scheme.
II. If G = G, then let F =  2kl+ x+Pmj=1 xjj and J = z+Pmj=1 zjj . If F = 0, then
B aborts because it cannot simulate the signature. Otherwise, B chooses q; T ; x; ';  2R Zp
and sets g
q
(ga)
1
F
= gs (thus q = s+ aF ). B returns toA the signature  = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6;
7; 8) on M :
(1) = g
 aJ
F   gW x+'   gJgF2 q   gJgF2 
= g
 aJ
F   gW x+'   gJgF2 s+ aF   gJgF2 
= g
 aJ
F  (gW )x+'   gJgF2 s   gJgF2  aF   gJgF2 
= gab   gW x+'   gJgF2 s   gJgF2 
= gab   gW x+'   gJgF2 s+
(2) = g
x+' (3) = g
s+ (4) = g
(x+')sT  xs1  '2
(5) = g
xs
1 (6) = g
'
2 (7) = g
(x+')s
(8) = g
T s
The signature  generated by B in the security game has the same distribution as the
signature generated by Sign of the scheme. Note that s depends on q which is uniformly
at random chosen from Zp, therefore the entire value of s is random in the view of A,
same as in the scheme. Finally, the values T ; x; ';  are chosen uniformly random same as
in the scheme.
3. Forgery: A outputs a valid forgery (M; ;<;mpk;G) where F  = 0 (mod p) and J =
z +
Pm
j=1 zj

j . If F
 6= 0(mod p) then B aborts. Note that a valid signature  has the
following form:
(1) = g
ab  (gW )x+'  gJ(s+) (2) = gx+' (3) = gs+
(4) = g
(x+')sT  xs1  '2 (5) = gxs1 (6) = g'2
(7) = g
(x+')s (8) = g
T s
where the tag T encoded in (4) and (8) should be for members not in the list <. B solves
the CDH problem as follows:
(1)   W(2)   J(3) = gab  (gW )x+'  gJs  (gx+') W  (gs+) J = gab:
B does not abort if in the Setup phase correctly guesses the group G = f1; :::; kg, in the
Sign Query the F 6= 0(mod p), and in the Forgery phase the F   0(mod p). The probability
that B in the Setup phase guesses G is 1
2k
. The probability that for each individual Sign Query
the F  6= 0(mod p) is 1   12l , therefore the total probability for l queries is larger than 12 ,
and the probability that F   0(mod p) is 12ml . Since, the advantage of A is , B solves CDH
assumption with probability ^  
2k+2ml
.2
4 Conclusion
We propose a verier-local revocation identity-based group signature (VLR-IBGS) scheme
based on prime order bilinear groups with a security proof under standard assumptions.
Indeed, this is the rst VLR group signature scheme which achieves simultaneously three de-
sirable properties: supporting membership revocation, having a security proof in the standard
model and being identity-based group signature scheme where the group public key is derived
from the group identity. We prove that the scheme has the property of seless-anonymity
under the Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumption and that it is fully-traceable under the Com-
putational Die-Hellman (CDH) assumption.
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